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Abstract: 
  The wide scope of discovery and judicial review in Tummino v. Torti is directly 
traced to the prohibition against political motivations in agency decision-making.  The 
FDA in evaluating the OTC switch application for Plan B was most likely influenced by 
the Bush White House political agenda.  As the case law stands, Tummino was decided 
correctly because political influence in agency decision-making is seen as bad faith and 
not as sufficient rationale for decisions.  However, within in the past thirty years 
Presidents have become successfully increasingly aggressive about use administrative 
agencies such as the FDA to accomplish their political agendas.  As this trend seems 
unlikely to dissipate any time soon, a better judicial approach would be to allow agencies 
to admit to political influences in their decision-making.  This would then allow judges to 
determine if the political influence was permissible or if it prevented the agency from 
accomplishing its mandate.  Furthermore, it would reduce temptation to manipulate the 
scientific record to support agency conclusions when those conclusions were actually 
based on policy judgments.   2 
   
In the recent decision in Tummino v. Torti
1 the District Judge, Judge Korman, 
chastised the Food and Drug Administrative (FDA) for bowing to political pressures 
while evaluating an over the counter switch for an emergency contraception known as 
Plan B.  The decision was notable because, unlike most cases of judicial review of 
administrative agency decisions, the scope of discovery and the opinion of the court were 
not limited to the administrative record generated by the FDA.  This was largely a result 
of the perceived ‘bad faith’ of the FDA in its treatment of the Plan B application, which 
itself was based on the political influence of the Bush White House on the FDA. 
  However, the Tummino case is an opportunity to reconsider the role of the 
executive branch on administrative agencies such as the FDA.  While the FDA is 
rightfully seen as a scientific nonpartisan agency, in recent years its agenda has been 
increasingly influenced by various Presidential administrations
2.  Indeed, the FDA is 
hardly unique in this trend of increasing executive capture of administrative agencies.  
While the Bush White House may have unduly pressured the FDA to avoid approving an 
over the counter switch for Plan B, its involvement is hardly unusual in the modern 
history of the FDA.  When considered against the backdrop of the current reality of the 
administrative state, the decision-making in Tummino does not seem faulty. 
Contrary the trend of increasing presidential influence, the prevailing policy of the 
courts is to uniformly reject all obvious political influence as arbitrary and capricious.   
Under this current policy, political motivations are treated as corrupting and suspect 
                                                 
1 603 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
2 See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial 
Review, Politics and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise,  93 CORNELL L. REV. 939 (2008). 
   3 
while scientific rationales are legitimate.  Based on current law, Tummino was correctly 
decided on the grounds that the FDA based its decision on motivations that were arbitrary 
and capricious. 
This paper proposes that the reality of the administrative state and the policies of 
administrative law be harmonized.  There ought to be judicially allowed room for 
agencies to admit that their decisions were partially motivated by the agenda of the 
President at the time.  This would allow agencies such as the FDA to ‘drop the charade’ 
maintaing that Presidents such as Reagan, Clinton, Bush and now Obama do not 
influence the agencies’ agenda, priorities and decisions.  In turn, that would allow courts 
to better oversee the increasing political influence of the White House and to check it 
when inappropriate.  In addition, this new policy would prevent agencies such as the 
FDA from attempted to use scientific evidence and uncertainty to justify what are in 
reality political decisions.  Essentially, this paper argues that honesty is the best policy. 
Part I will document the history of the FDA’s decision on the over the counter 
application of Plan B.  It will also explore the holding of Tummino.  Part II will discuss 
the importance of the bad faith exception—how undue political motivations were 
characterized in Tummino—to the administrative law rule that courts only look at the 
administrative record.  Part III will examine the deliberative process privilege, which is a 
privilege that usually shields administrative agencies somewhat from judicial scrutiny.  It 
will also look to see why the court allowed such expansive discovery, to the point of even 
requiring higher-level FDA officials to testify.  Part IV will address two key problems 
with rejecting FDA and other agencies political motivations.  The first problem will be 
the problem of the political reality, namely that the Presidential control of the   4 
administrative state has grown tighter.  The second problem will be the problem of 
scientific evidence, or that because agencies such as the FDA have an incentive to couch 
their decisions in terms of scientific evidence and uncertainty they are tempted to 
manipulate the scientific record to justify legitimate political concerns and influences. 
 
I.  Background 
 
FDA’s Approval Process of Plan B 
Plan B is an emergency contraceptive pill, meaning that it works prior to 
implantation of a fertilized egg and does not interrupt or harm an established pregnancy
3.  
It is time sensitive, which means that it may be more effective as an over the counter 
medication as opposed to a medication that women must find a doctor to prescribe
4. 
In 1998, the FDA approved emergency contraception by prescription only.  As a 
response, in 2001 the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals and sixty-five 
other organizations filled a citizen’s petition, asking the FDA to switch Plan B (which 
then required a prescription) to over the counter (OTC) status
5.  Citizen petitions are 
requests for agency action on scientific and safety issues that any individual, group or 
company can file, thus creating a mechanism to facilitate public input on FDA 
                                                 
3 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Food and Drug Administration: Decision Process to 
Deny Initial Over-the-Counter Marketing of the Emergency Contraceptive Drug Plan B 
Was Unusual, 16 (2005), available at http:// 
oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051116110800-24167.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].  
4 Id. at 16-17. 
5 Id. at    5 
regulations
6.  The FDCA authorizes individuals to submit citizen’s petitions, provided 
they follow a certain form
7.  It also requires that the Commissioner shall respond to each 
petitioner within 180 days of receipt of the petition, either approving its requests, denying 
those requests or explaining why the agency has been unable to reach a decision on the 
petition
8.  However, generally, this deadline is rarely met though usually the agency will 
initially respond that a substantive determination is not yet feasible
9.  Therefore, the FDA 
is required to respond to these petitions, but is not required to act upon them as long as 
they are acknowledged. 
In 2003, after some encouraging meetings with the FDA staff as to the probability 
of approval, the Plan B sponsor (then Women’s Capital Corporation and now Barr 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) submitted a supplemental new drug application (SNDA) 
requesting that Plan B be switched from prescription only to OTC status without age or 
point of sale restriction.  Using an NDA to switch from prescription to OTC status is not 
unusual.  Almost all Rx-OTC switches have occurred through the NDA process, since the 
FDA finished publishing the tentative final OTC monographs in the Federal Register
10. 
There is no clear guidance from the FDA as to which drugs are appropriate to 
OTC status and which drugs ought to remain prescription only.  The statutory definition 
of prescription drugs includes drugs that “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for 
harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is 
                                                 
6 Jordan Paradis, Alison W. Tisdale, Ralph F. Hall & Efrosini Kokkoli, Evaluating 
Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and 
Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 618 (Winter 2009) 
7 21 C.F.R. §10.30 (2009). 
8 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2009). 
9 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG 
LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS, 1559 (3rd ed. 2007). 
10 Id. at 527.   6 
not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to 
administer such drug.”
11  Therefore, the key factors that the FDA considers when 
determining the OTC/prescription status of a drug are toxicity, which is fairly 
straightforward, potentiality for harmful effect, which allows for the FDA to conduct a 
broad inquiry and method of use, which “encompasses all aspects of the circumstances 
under which a drug is used, including broad questions of social policy.”
12  As a result, 
there is relatively little the FDA cannot consider when deciding whether to switch a drug 
from prescription to non-prescription status. 
The advisory committees that reviewed the SNDA, the Nonprescription Drug 
Advisory Committee and the Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee, voted in 
favor of a prescription to OTC switch for plan B.  In fact, the members of the joint 
advisory committee voted 23 to 4 to allow Plan B to be marketed over the counter
13.  
However, in response to criticism by a small minority on the committee, Barr amended 
the SDNA to allow nonprescription access to women sixteen and older only.  Despite this 
amendment, senior management at the FDA decided that the Plan B application was not 
approvable.  This was because, “the Commissioner and senior CDER management 
believed that the number of adolescents in the actual use study was inadequate.”
14  
It is important when considering the story of Plan B to remember that this was not 
the first time the FDA has overruled the recommendations of drug review panels to 
switch a medication to OTC status.  For example, in the mid-1970’s the FDA 
disapproved of a SNDA for a prescription expectorant drug named “Benylin”, despite the 
                                                 
11 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A). 
12 Hutt et al., at 524. 
13 GAO report at 14. 
14 Quoted in Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F.Supp.2d 212, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).   7 
fact that the OTC Dug Review panel had recommended its switch in OTC status
15.  In 
fact, the FDA Commissioner at the time even overruled an Administrative Law Judge 
who ruled that Benylin is safe for OTC
16.  Benylin was used as a cough drug, and 
therefore it was unlikely to have the political baggage of emergency contraception.  
Advisory committees are very useful, and the FDA often relies on their 
recommendations.  However, the FDA is free to reject these recommendations. 
After receiving additional data, the FDA issued a letter indicating that the 
scientific evidence was sufficient to support Plan B as an OTC product only for women 
seventeen years of age or older
17.  On August 24, 2006, five years after the Citizen’s 
Petition and three years after the SNDA, the FDA issued a final decision on the SDNA 
for Plan B.  Plan B was made available without a prescription for women eighteen years 
and older but only through venues with a licensed pharmacist on staff.  It is important to 
note that although the FDA took a long time to respond to the SDNA, it ultimately did 
respond. 
The response from Congress to the FDA’s rejection of OTC status for Plan B 
indicated a distrust of the motivations behind the FDA’s decision.  Senator Hillary 
Clinton, as well as twenty-three other US senators, requested that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) join with the Senate to investigate the Plan B decision
18.  
The GAO found four irregularities in the treatment of the SDNA.  First, the directors of 
the Office of Drug Evaluation and the Office of New Drugs, who would normally be 
responsible for signing off on such action letters, did not sign the ‘not-approvable’ letter 
                                                 
15 Hutt et al., at 527. 
16 GAO report at 15. 
17 Id. at 16. 
18 See GAO report.   8 
largely because they disagreed with the decision
19.  Second, the FDA’s senior leadership 
was uncharacteristically highly involved with the Plan B OTC switch.  For example, the 
GAO investigators found that “FDA review staff told us that they were told early in the 
review process that the decision would be made by high-level management”
20.  Third, the 
GAO investigators found that the evidence suggested that the decision to not approve 
Plan B was made even before the review process was completed, maybe even months 
beforehand
20.  Lastly, the GAO found that “the Acting Direct of CDER’s decision was 
novel and did not follow the FDA’s traditional practices”
21.  It is hard to imagine that the 
GAO report did not inform the judicial decisions in Tummino, and in fact, it is cited 
frequently in the court documents. 
 
The Case Itself 
The plaintiffs filed several causes of action that can be grouped into 
administrative law claims and constitutional law claims.  The plaintiffs made 
administrative law claims in their first cause of action (that the FDA’s denial of OTC 
switch for persons of all ages is arbitrary and capricious), the second cause of action (the 
FDA has exceeded statutory authority) and the fifth cause of action (the FDA’s failure to 
approve the OTC for Plan B was an unreasonable delay)
22.  The plaintiffs also brought 
several constitutional law claims, such as the third cause of action (the right to privacy) 
and the fourth cause of action (sex discrimination)
23. However, the court generally 
                                                 
19 Id. at 5. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 60-62, 67-68, 2005 W.L. 6029405 (2005). 
23 Id. ¶¶63-66   9 
avoided engaging in the constitutional law questions and focused solely on the 
administrative law questions
24.  Therefore, this paper will focus on the administrative law 
issues. 
The ensuring court case was notable from an administrative law standpoint for 
several reasons.  First, the magistrate judge allowed for an expansive scope of 
discovery
25.  The court did not confine itself to the administrative record.  In addition, 
higher-level FDA officials were required to testify.  This is something that was virtually 
unprecedented.  Expanding the scope of discovery and requiring FDA testimony raises 
important policy questions about the interaction between the courts and the FDA.  
Namely, this case raises the question of where to set the boundaries between the FDA and 
political actors.  If any political motivation or interaction constitutes bad faith, the 
expansive scope of discovery in this case is justified.  However, if there was no bad faith, 
the FDA perhaps ought to be accorded more privacy than the court allowed it. 
The question what constitutes bad faith leads into the holding of this case. Judge 
Korman found that the FDA had acted in an impermissible manner, largely because the 
delays and treatment of Plan B seemed exceptional and motivated by political 
considerations.  He then ordered that Plan B be made over the counter for women 
seventeen and older and that the FDA reconsider its decisions regarding the Plan B 
switch to OTC use
26.  Judge Korman found that “the FDA simply has offered no evidence 
that age restriction would be unenforceable at 17 rather than 18” in response to the 
FDA’s justification of the need for administrative convenience to support its decision to 
                                                 
24 See Carmel Shachar, Administrative Law v. Constitutional Law: The Correct Decision 
on FDA’s Treatment of Plan B, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 523 (2009). 
25 Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F.Supp.2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
26 Tummino v. Torti, 603 F.Supp.2d 519, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).   10 
limit Plan B to those over seventeen
27.  Furthermore, the scientific evidence supported the 
contention that seventeen year olds could safely take Plan B without a doctor’s 
supervision
28.   
The opinion avoided constitutional law questions and focused on questions of 
administrative law. However, despite the careful avoidance of constitutional questions, 
the opinion in Tummino reflects and was colored by politics and policy judgments.  For 
example, Judge Korman felt comfortable remanding the SDNA to the FDA because due 
to the election of President Obama and the subsequent changeover in FDA leadership, the 
FDA can be “trusted to conduct a fair assessment of the scientific evidence” and that 
evaluating such evidence was best left to the expertise of the FDA and not the courts
29. 
Tummino allowed the court a broad scope, both in discovery and in consideration.  
The broadness of this scope was directly related to the issue of the ever-increasing 
influence that the executive branch has on the FDA.  Because the court focused almost 
entirely on administrative law questions, Tummino provides an excellent lens through 
which to examine the interplay between the reality of the administrative state and the 
judicial review of agency proceedings. 
 
II.  Judicial Review of Agency Proceedings 
 
  One of the major points of contention in Tummino was whether to allow 
discovery beyond the administrative record.  Discovery beyond the record entailed 
                                                 
27 Id. at 550. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 549.   11 
discovery into communications and correspondence between individuals within and 
outside of the FDA as well as testimony of certain FDA decision makers.  Discovery 
beyond the record would mean that certain normally privilege documents would be 
presented to the court but also that the Judge could consider more than just the 
administrative record while evaluating the FDA’s decision-making process.  The 
magistrate judge ultimately allowed discovery beyond the administrative record
30.  
However, the decision to allow discovery beyond the record raises many policy questions 
about the role of politics and science in FDA, and other agency, decision making. 
  In most cases, “a court reviewing an agency decision is confined to the 
administrative record compiled by that agency when it made the decision”
31.  This is 
referred to as the ‘record rule’.  This stems from the APA, which limited the scope of 
judicial review largely to the administrative record
32.  The policy behind the ‘record rule’ 
expresses a desire to prevent the judiciary from supplanting the agency’s judgment with 
its own.  The ‘record rule’ prevents judgment substitution by requiring that “the focal 
point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not 
some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”
33  Therefore, the default scope of 
discovery and judicial review in Tummino would have been to review only the record that 
the FDA produced. 
  However, there are exceptions to the ‘record rule’.  Since the “central point of 
judicial review was to respond to open-ended delegation of discretionary power by 
                                                 
30 Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F.Supp.2d 212 (2006). 
31 National Audubon Soc. V. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (FED. CIR. 1997). 
32 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §706. 
33 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).   12 
ensuring a firm check on agency decisions that might be “irrational or discriminatory”
34.”  
For example, the scope of discovery may be expanded and the record may be 
supplemented when the record does not support the agency action, when the agency has 
not considered all the relevant factors or when the reviewing court does not have enough 
information to evaluate the challenged action on the basis of the administrative record
35.   
A showing of bad faith or improper behavior by agency decision makers is one of 
the more common reasons used to justify expanding the scope of review
36.  Essentially, 
the showing of bad faith rebuts the presumption of regularity entitled to an agency and its 
administrative record
37. Another exception to the ‘record rule’, agency inaction, also has 
much in common with bad faith.  Under the APA a court can compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed
38.  Because the record may be limited in 
situations in which agencies do not act, courts are often guided by ‘TRAC’ factors when 
reviewing cases of agency inaction.  TRAC factors include any Congressional timetables, 
a rule of reason, whether the proposal regulation is economic or affects human health and 
welfare, the agency’s other priorities and activities, and the interest affected
39.  At the 
bottom line, in delay cases, “the agency must justify its delay to the court’s 
satisfaction.”
40  This indicates that the court in delayed actions is looking to understand if 
and why there is a unusual delay and that usually hinges upon whether the agency is 
acting in good faith or not. 
                                                 
34 Thomas Miles, Cass Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 761 (2008). 
35 Florida Power & Lights Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
36 Hoffman, 132 F.3d at 14. 
37 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1329 (D.C. CIR. 1984). 
38 APA, 5 U.S.C. §706. 
39 In re Barr Laboratories, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74-75 (D.C.CIR. 1991). 
40 Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 898 (D.C.CIR. 1987).   13 
Once bad faith is shown, the court may even require administrative officials to 
testify as to their actions.  However, the Supreme Court counseled “where there are 
administrative findings that were made at the same time as the decision…there must be a 
strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such inquiry can be made.”
41  
Therefore, even under the exceptions there is a sense that expanding the scope of 
discovery beyond the administrative record and probing into the mental processes of the 
administrative decision makers is undesirable
42.  Government transparency is an 
important value.  However, too much government transparency can make it difficult for 
the administrative state to run smoothly and protect itself from capture from industry and 
other interested groups. 
The opinion in Tummino underscores the importance of defining bad faith 
reasonably.  Judge Korman did not decide the case based on the plaintiffs’ claims that the 
FDA violated their rights to privacy and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment
43.  
The only APA claim brought was the charge that the FDA’s actions are “arbitrary and 
capricious”, which generally would limit discovery and the scope of judicial review to the 
administrative record unless bad faith was shown
44.  The access the plaintiffs had to FDA 
records and testimony that would have otherwise been unavailable hinged entirely on 
whether the court thought the White House agenda impermissibly influenced the FDA’s 
decision-making process. 
 
                                                 
41 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
42 U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). 
43 Claims from Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 63-64 & 65-66 2005 W.L. 6029405 
(2005). 
44 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985).   14 
III.  Deliberative Process Privilege 
 
  It is highly unusual for FDA officials to have to testify in court cases, as they 
were required to do in Tummino.  This is in part because of deliberative process privilege, 
which serves to act as a shield for agency decision makers against judicial review.  By 
rejecting deliberative process privilege, the Tummino court set the stage to evaluate the 
FDA’s decision-making process for bad faith. 
Deliberative process privilege protects the decision-making processes and policy 
discussions of governmental agencies and executive departments
45.  This generally 
includes materials that if revealed would “expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in 
such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine 
the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”
46  As a common-law judicial privilege, it 
protects material that is pre-decisional and deliberative or not factual
47. 
The deliberative privilege process draws heavily upon the Morgan doctrine.  In 
Morgan v. US, the Supreme Court stated that courts cannot examine the inner processes 
of an administrator’s mental state in reaching an administrative conclusion.
48  The 
Morgan doctrine and the widespread acceptance of the deliberative process principle 
imply that our jurisprudence places a relatively high value on administrative secrecy. 
                                                 
45 See Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the 
Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 349 (2009). 
46 Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 
(D.C. CIR. 1987). 
47 See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. CIR. 1997). 
48 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).   15 
  The intended result of the deliberative process privilege is to allow for candid and 
open discussion among government officials
49.  In turn open discussion will allow for 
better decision-making
50.  This has the benefit also of having agencies be judged only on 
their final decisions and avoids creating public confusion about the policies of an 
agency
51.  On the other hand, the deliberative process privilege can be characterized as 
one that promotes secrecy.  A popular sentiment in American political history is the need 
for government transparency.  As James Madison wrote, a “popular Government without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or, perhaps, both.
52”  Deliberative process privilege can have a chilling effect on 
judicial review of agency decision-making.  This is because an agency can use this 
privilege to “shield an agency’s reliance on evidence outside the scope of its statutory 
authority, as well as wholly biased, one-sided decisions.
53” 
  Deliberative process privilege is not absolute.  Instead, it may give way when the 
plaintiff demonstrates sufficient need for the contested information
54.  Factors to consider 
include “the relevance of the evidence, the availability of other evidence, the seriousness 
of the litigation, the role of the government and the possibility of future timidity by 
                                                 
49 See e.g. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973). 
50 See Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the 
Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2005). 
51 See Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1437 n. 10 (D.C. 
CIR. 1992) (Ginsburg, J.). 
52 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4th, 1822) in 9 The Writings of James 
Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (quoted in Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the 
Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 
53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 349 (2009)). 
53 Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the 
Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 349 (2009)). 
54 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.   16 
government employees.”
55  In situations where there is a claim of governmental 
misconduct, the government cannot hide behind deliberative process privilege
56.  The 
purpose of the APA is for courts to review the whole record for arbitrary or capricious 
decision-making.  Preventing this level of review through deliberative process privilege 
raises problematic questions about the balance of power between these executive 
agencies and the judicial branch
57.  However, it is unclear if plaintiffs merely need to 
alleged misconduct or if they must make some evidentiary showing to justify denying 
deliberative process privilege
58. 
The FDA, for much of its existence, has been a relatively private agency, perhaps 
out of necessity due to the subject matter it handles.  As Peter Barton Hutt noted, “The 
Food and Drug Administration is the largest repository of private scientific research in 
the world. [it] receive[s] mountains of important data and information…that is available 
nowhere else.”
59  In addition he noted that, “since 1938 virtually none of it has been 
divulged.”
60  In response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) the FDA proposed to 
make this information available for public disclosure upon request, which was codified in 
37 Fed. Reg. 9128 (May 5, 1972).  Clearly, the FOIA as well as the FDA’s regulations 
show that it is important for the public to have access to the information within the FDA 
files.   
However, the plaintiffs in Tummino asked for more than just the data on Plan B’s 
safety, effectiveness and functionality.  They were primarily interested in the interaction 
                                                 
55Id.. 
56 Id. at 738. 
57 Michael Ray Harris, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J. at 393. 
58 Michael N. Kennedy, 99 NW. U. L. REV. at 1787. 
59 Hutt et al, at 1589. 
60 Hutt et al, at 1589.   17 
between the FDA, its leadership, and the White House and requested “any documents 
that demonstrate or indicate unusual involvement of upper level FDA management in the 
FDA’s process regarding Plan B”
61.  This, they hoped, would help show bad faith on the 
part of the FDA. 
The FDA characterized the plaintiffs’ request as suggesting that “a federal agency 
were required to collect and include in the administrative record all documents in any 
form in its possession that related to a particular topic, whenever it is sued on that 
topic”
62 which would generate an astounding number of documents.  Furthermore, even 
FOIA has an exemption that applies to “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or 
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than the agency in litigation 
with the agency
63.”  The FDA deals with many sensitive decisions every day.  Allowing 
courts to frequently probe into its decision making process by denying it deliberative 
process privilege may ultimately hamper the FDA in its ability to carry out its mission. 
  Ultimately, in Tummino, the magistrate judge ruled that the FDA was prohibited 
from withholding on the basis of the deliberative process privilege
64.  As a result, the 
plaintiffs were also allowed to conduct depositions of key leadership of the FDA at this 
time
65.  The leadership required to testify included Steven Galson, Director of Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at the FDA from 2001 to 2007, Lester Crawford, 
the Commissioner of the FDA in 2005, and Janet Woodcock, the current direct for CDER 
                                                 
61 Pl. Ltr. Aug. 29, 2006, at 4 (Quoted 2006 WL 5303773, 12 (2006)). 
62 2006 WL 5303773 (E.D.N.Y.) (2006). 
63 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006). 
64  Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F.Supp.2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
65 Id. at 236.   18 
at the FDA
66.  In addition the magistrate judge allowed the plaintiffs to serve subpoenas 
for documents from the White House to the FDA and to elicit testimony from a former 
member of the White House staff, Jay Lefkowitz about the connection between the White 
House and the FDA’s leadership during the Plan B decision making process
67. 
  The District Judge in this case tried to narrow the focus of discovery somewhat by 
not completely rejecting deliberative process privilege. Instead, he maintained that “I 
think the issue is not going to be whether it's deliberative or not. The issue is going to be 
does it demonstrate bad faith on the part of the agency.... So the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s 
determination seems to me to turn on whether or not this evidence ... indicates the agency 
was acting in bad faith.” Tr. Conf July 26, 2006 (docket No. 185), at 14; id. at 13 (“the 
instruction to the [M]agistrate [Judge] should be is that if in his judgment it is 
deliberative, these documents evidence bad faith, that they should be disclosed”)
68.  
However, this did little to limit the scope of discovery in Tummino. 
  Certainly, a showing of bad faith is and should be an exception to deliberative 
process privilege.  The FDA noted when arguing against additional discovery, “Congress 
has assigned the responsibility for determining the prescription status of drugs to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and given that the prescription status of Plan B 
has engendered an extraordinary level of interesting…the notion that the involvement of 
high level FDA officials in deciding the status somehow constitute “bad faith” is 
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specious.”
69  The FDA may have acted in bad faith throughout this process—the delay 
for example is hardly laudatory—however, this situation raises clear questions about 
whether upper level political involvement in the FDA is evidence of bad faith. 
 
V.  Two Problems 
 
  The Tummino treatment of the FDA revealed two problems with the current 
approach to the courts reviewing FDA’s, and other agencies’, decisions.  First of all, 
despite the increasing influence the president and the executive play in the administrative 
state, agencies are still penalized for incorporating the political into their decisions.  This 
in turns puts pressure on agencies, such as the FDA, to find scientific reasons for political 
decisions.  While an emphasis on science before politics has value, requiring scientific 
justification when the justifications are really only political can result in another problem.  
When agencies must call upon science to mask the role of politics, the scientific evidence 
can often be manipulated.  Thus, scientific uncertain can turn into scientific certainty and 
vice versa.  The problems of political exclusion and scientific malleability in judicial 
review are intertwined and influence each other. 
 
The Political Problem 
  Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
70, judicial review has been constructed to legitimate 
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scientific expertise over politics in administrative decision-making
71.  In that case the 
court upheld the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s decision to rescind a 
seat belt requirement solely on technocratic justifications.  In doing so, the court ignored 
the motivation this agency had to change its rule to comply with new President Reagan’s 
administrative goals, although then-Justice Rehnquist, in a partial dissent, did find it 
reasonable to change policies based on the election of a new President
72.   
Since then most courts when reviewing agency decision-making have evaluated 
the administrative record in two ways.  First, the judges check to see if there was any 
undue political influence.  Second, the judges look to see if the scientific evidence 
supports the agency’s conclusions.  This approach has “promoted vigorously the control 
of administrative policy by bureaucratic experts, not only by enabling them to fill the 
space that Congress might have occupied by also by requiring that agency action bear the 
indicia of essentially apolitical, “expert’ process and judgment.”
73  The expectation of the 
judiciary is that scientific experts, not politicians, will run the administrative state.  The 
FDA is not supposed to be an exception to this technocratic model.   
The Tummino ruling was clearly in line with current judicial policy.  The 
magistrate judge, when allowing discovery beyond the administrative record, raised the 
possibility of bad faith (one of the exceptions to the record rule) by referencing deviations 
from the technocratic model.  He noted that, “[t]he professional staff of the FDA voiced 
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strenuous objections to the consideration of such matters [the impact that OTC access for 
emergency contraception might have on adolescent sexual activity] as being beyond the 
mandate of the agency”
74.  The magistrate judge then took the resignation of the Direct of 
the Office of Women’s Health (and a non-political employee of the FDA) over the Plan B 
decision as “further support for the plaintiffs’ position that improper considerations, 
unrelated to science or to the mandate of the FDA, has prompted the FDA’s decisions 
concerning Plan B.”
75  Judge Korman, in his ruling in Tummino, echoed the magistrate 
judge’s conclusion that bad faith was present because the FDA had been influenced by 
politics.   
  However, the technocratic focus in Tummino and in the wider case law ignores 
important relatively recent changes in the relationship between the White House and the 
administrative agencies.  As Elena Kagan noted, “President Clinton, building on a 
foundation President Reagan laid, increasingly made the regulatory activity of the 
executive branch agencies into extensions of his own policy and political agenda…by 
exercising directive authority of these agencies.”
76  Reagan required executive agencies 
to submit to the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for Presidential 
review of any major rule, which gave the president substantial control over these 
agencies.
77  Clinton continued to use this strategy he inherited from his predecessors but 
to trigger agency action and regulate instead of deregulate
78.   
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  In fact, Clinton’s use of the FDA shows that Tummino was not the first case in 
which a President attempted to use FDA rulemaking to further his domestic agenda.  A 
frequently cited example of Presidential influence on the FDA is 1996 rule about 
advertising and distribution of tobacco products to minors
79.  Clinton made teen smoking 
a campaign issue in 1996 and lead public relations efforts to announce its proposal and 
adoption
80.  In fact, when Clinton announced the publication of a proposed rule to reduce 
teen smoking he used language such as, “I am announcing broad executive action to 
protect the young people of the United States from the awful dangers of tobacco”, 
“Therefore, by executive authority, I will restrict sharply the advertising” and “I am 
authorizing to the Food and Drug Administration to initiate a broad series of steps all 
designed to stop sales…”
81.  However, despite his involvement in drafting the proposal 
and his role as the public face of the proposal, the final documents issued by the FDA say 
nothing about Clinton’s involvement in the rulemaking.  Instead, the final documents 
focus on the technocratic concerns of the FDA.  They contain regulations for tobacco 
manufacturers and vendors, health-related justification and a defense of FDA 
jurisdiction
82.   
These regulations were the subject of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.
83  In the Supreme Court’s review of these regulations President Clintons name is 
not mentioned even once, and his role is whitewashed from the discussion of the 
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regulations.  Clearly, from an administrative law point of view, the FDA was correct to 
refrain from including Clinton’s political influence in their documents, although the 
regulations were ultimately struck down.  However, this experience suggests that by 
providing motivation for agencies to bury the involvement of Presidents in their rule 
making leads to an incomplete judicial review of agency decision-making.  The FDA teen 
smoking story shows that Presidential involvement in FDA’s affairs is not unprecedented.  
It also shows that Presidents of either political leaning often hijack the FDA’s decision-
making process. 
After the examples set by Reagan and Clinton, the potential of administrative 
agencies as a tool to further presidential agendas—and avoid potential battles with hostile 
Congressmen—has been cemented.  The gene is out of the bottle and certainly any future 
presidents will understand the value of incorporating agency action into their political 
agendas.  In fact, scholars such as Kagan have applauded this development as increasing 
administrative accountability and effectiveness
84. Lawrence Lessig documents a shift in 
the judiciary from a belief in an independent and scientific administrative state seen 
earlier in the twentieth century to a view that the administrative state “cannot be 
understood in the neutral, scientific, apolitical sense in which it was understood by the 
founders of the administrative state…[i]t is instead now seen by all to be essentially 
‘political’”
85.  Therefore, it seems a fairly uncontroversial conclusion that the 
administrative state, and the FDA as part of that complex, has become politicized and 
will never be independent from political influences. 
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It seems odd, at best, to penalize the FDA—other any other agency—simply for 
not resisting the agenda of the President. The President, as a nationally elected figure, 
seems to have some public mandate to dictate which issues should get priority on 
administrative agencies’ ‘to do lists’.  While the FDA’s primary responsibility ought to 
be to ensure public safety, it is possible for the President to influence its agenda without 
undermining its focus.  There is a difference between allowing a decision on bald 
Presidential political calculation and Presidential guidance.  In the case of an agency 
simply hiding behind a Presidential decree, courts could still determine the decision to be 
arbitrary because “he said so” is not good reasoning full stop
86.  However, when coupled 
with factual and scientific evidence, admissions of Presidential influence could help 
develop a fuller administrative record
87.  This could benefit judicial review by allowing 
judges to evaluate the interaction between the executive political agenda and the 
nonpolitical responsibilities of the FDA or other administrative agencies.   
Obviously, it will be difficult to distinguish between permissible and 
impermissible political influences.  Kathryn Watts distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ 
political influences as being policy considerations and political value judgments and 
‘illegitimate’ political influences as being raw political goals or pure partisan politics
88.  
A key factor ought to be the interplay between the political goals and the purpose of the 
agencies.  For example, Clinton’s push for teen smoking regulations were a political goal 
but resulted in regulations that furthered the FDA’s goal of protecting public health and 
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welfare.  In fact, Clinton’s involvement might give additional justification to the FDA’s 
decision to regulate tobacco because as President (and an elected figure, unlike most of 
the decision-makers in the FDA) he has a public mandate to further his proposed policy 
agenda.  One might argue that those voting for Clinton knew that he was interested in 
regulating teen smoking and therefore the public gave approval to use the FDA in such a 
way.  Legitimate political influences ought to be reflected in the record to give a judicial 
reviewer a better understanding of not only the agency’s decision making in reaction to 
Presidential pressure but also how voters might have a change of attitudes towards what 
an administrative agency ought to accomplish.    
On the other hand, illegitimate political influences, such as those that prevent the 
agency from accomplishing its mandate, ought to still be rejected by the courts.  MA v. 
EPA
89 illustrates a situation in which illegitimate political influences were rejected and 
one in which even if some political influences would be allow they would still be 
rejected.  There were worries that the Bush administration tampered with global warming 
data reported by federal agencies to introduce greater doubt and uncertainty as to the 
scientific evidence and placed a good deal of pressure on the EPA to refuse to regulate 
greenhouse gasses
90.  Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule characterized the Supreme 
Court’s reaction as expertise forcing, or an “attempt by courts to ensure that agencies 
exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures, or especially political 
pressures emanating from the White House or political appointees in the agencies.”
91  
Expertise forcing, they say, is directly against the rationale of Chevron, which 
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harmonizes democratic politics and expertise as complementary
92. Another example of 
impermissible considerations would be the charges that FDA officials harassed 
employees of the Bureau of Drugs when their decisions can contrary to drug 
manufacturers’ interests
93.  Clearly, when the President is attempted to alter evidence and 
to pressure agencies to decline their mandate, courts ought to still reject political 
influence as an acceptable rationale for decision-making.   
Returning back to Tummino, it is unclear which category Tummino falls into.  The 
Plaintiffs charged “the FDA bowed to political pressure from the White House and anti-
abortion constituents despite the uniform recommendation of the FDA’s scientific review 
staff to approve over-the-counter access to Plan B without limitation.”
94  Certainly Judge 
Korman agreed with the Plaintiff’s assessment that this was illegitimate political 
pressure, citing the timing of FDA’s approval of Plan B for women over eighteen as 
linked to the confirmation of Dr von Eschenbach as FDA commissioner
95.  In addition, 
the undue delays in consider the Citizen Petitions and the SNDA indicate that the FDA 
felt pressure to refrain from its true mission—to evaluate potential drugs for the 
consumer market.   
However, there are some indications that the FDA’s actions were not outside 
legitimate political influence.  Certainly the FDA has been influenced by Presidential 
agendas before, so the sensitivity the FDA had about Plan B related to the Bush 
administration’s policies are not extraordinary.  In addition, as also discussed above, the 
FDA has rejected the recommendations of advisory committees in other situations.  
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While the FDA ought to make it a priority to respond to NDAs and Citizen Petitions, 
there is no fundamental right of access to drugs
96.  Plan B was already available by 
prescription, so there was perhaps less pressure to evaluate it since it was already 
available to the public. 
 
The Scientific Problem 
A corollary of the political influence problem is the scientific evidence problems.  
Another problem raised by the blanket rejection of political influences in the 
administrative record is the pressure it puts on the scientific evidence.  When agencies 
cannot admit the political motivations of their decision-making they are forced to 
manipulate the scientific record to support their decisions.  This can be egregious, as in 
MA v. EPA, or it can be more moderate, such as suggesting scientific uncertainty when 
the evidence is fairly conclusive.  This impulse to play with scientific certainty could be 
lessened if agencies were allowed to ‘come clean’ about their political influences. 
Part of the scientific problem is that judges, as non-scientific experts, can only be 
so sophisticated when evaluating the scientific evidence in the administrative record.  The 
first step in the judicial review of the scientific data is to see if it is certain or uncertain.  
If the evidence is certain, then the agency has based its decision making on reasons that 
are not arbitrary or capricious.  If the scientific data is uncertain, that suggests that the 
agency has used other reasons beside the data.  Unfortunately, “[t]his legal inquiry into 
the existence of uncertainty is not as easy a question for the court to answer as it might 
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seem, given that the determination of certainty involves both reaching a certain level of 
scientific understanding and making normative judgments about the nature of science.”
97 
The scientific uncertainty problem raises it head in areas outside of agency 
decision-making.  The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacueticals
98 
required judges to act as scientific gatekeepers on matters of expert testimony in order to 
ensure standards for relevance and reliability.  However, manufacturers have capitalized 
on the scientific naivety of judges by suggesting scientific uncertainty even where there is 
none.  For example, in 1994 the FDA required the manufacturer of Parlodel, a drug to 
stop postpartum lactation, to stop selling the drug due to increases in risks of 
hypertension, seizure and stroke
99.  However, when consumers sued the drug’s 
manufacturer many judges refused to allow expert testimony on the link between Parlodel 
and circulatory disorders or even threw out the case for lack of scientific uncertainty
100. 
In this situation, the judges had required a higher level of certainty than the FDA.  
Clearly, scientific uncertainty in the courts is an element can that be used to 
undermine effective judicial review.  Problems could be minimized by using a weight-of-
the-evidence approach, which looks at each piece of evidence in context as opposed to on 
its own for reliability
101.  However, the judicial attention devoted to the science seems 
somewhat misplaced.  Agencies are quite good at evaluating the relevant science in their 
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field.  For example, despite the above mentioned example of Mass v. EPA there are few 
instances of the EPA using unreliable science or science inappropriately to support a final 
regulation
102.  Furthermore, there are better institutions to evaluate scientific disputes, 
such as the FDA’s Public Board of Inquiry
103.   
In Tummino the FDA may have manufactured some scientific uncertainty in order 
to justify its treatment of Plan B in regards to adolescents.  Officials in the FDA 
maintained that there was not enough evidence to allow OTC status of Plan B for 
adolescents, particularly young adolescents
104.  As the GAO noted, “there are no age-
related marketing restrictions for any prescription or OTC contraceptives that FDA has 
approved, and FDA has not required pediatric studies for them…FDA identified no 
issues that would require age-related restrictions in the review of the original prescription 
Plan B new drug application.”
105  The then acting director of the FDA countered the 
GAO report by arguing that the FDA explicitly considered the differing levels of 
cognitive maturity of adolescents of different ages, though he admitted this was an 
unprecedented rationale to reject an OTC switch application.
106  However, other FDA 
officials, such as the Director of the Office of New Drugs maintained that the FDA ‘has a 
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long history of extrapolating findings from clinical trials in older patients to adolescents 
in both prescription and non-prescription approvals.”
107 
The most logical narrative here, one that Judge Korman embraced in his 
opinion
108, is that the high level FDA officials hid their political agenda behind a demand 
for more research on adolescents.  The Bush White House had made its position on Plan 
B OTC status clear and the political appointees of the FDA were perhaps doing their best 
to respond to the pressure.  However, the requirement that the rationales behind their 
decision-making be based on scientific facts and evidence meant that they could not 
reflect the pressures that led to their reluctance to approve OTC status for Plan B for all 
ages.  This lead to the need to demand studies on the sexual behavior of adolescents, 
particularly young adolescents, and the impact OTC Plan B would have on these women. 
While this may be valuable information, it seems, as the GAO and Judge Korman 
noted, arbitrary and capricious to require these kinds of studies if all other contraceptives 
and OTC switch applications do not have to satisfy this requirement.  It seems 
particularly arbitrary and capricious if the demand for more studies is based on political 
influences.  However, acknowledging that in the current political climate the FDA must 
move carefully on applications such as Plan B seems less arbitrary and capricious and 
more honest and open.  While obviously we want the FDA to treat similarly situated 
applications equally, there are certain times at which applications are different from the 
point of the agency that have to do with the sensitivity of the case.  It would be better to 
acknowledge that when calling for additional scientific information than to hide behind 
                                                 
107 GAO report at 32-33. 
108 Tummino v. Torti, 603 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).   31 
scientific uncertainty when there is none or when it is normally not grounds for 
disapproval of the application. 
In fact, when we consider that the FDA does not treat all applications equally, the 
call for additional scientific evidence in politically sensitive cases becomes more 
palatable.  As the GAO noted in its report, the FDA already changes protocol to involve 
high-level management when directors of the reviewing offices would normally make the 
decision in highly visible and sensitive cases, such as the approval of thalidomide for the 
treatment of leprosy in 1998 and the approval of mifepristone for the termination of early 
pregnancy in 2000 (although these were not OTC switch applications)
109.  In fact, the 
Commissioner and the Direct of CDER often become involved in cases when they have 
far-reaching impact, or in cases in which management has a different view or disagrees 
with the review staff, or any time when the management needs to make sure it is 
comfortable with the review staff’s final decision
110.  It is hard to imagine that the 
management changes protocol for these sensitive cases for any other reason besides that 
sensitive cases require that the FDA produce a strongly reasoned and justified decision, 
no matter what the course.   
Similarly, in sensitive cases the FDA wants to make sure that the scientific 
evidence behind its decision-making is impeccable.  It would not be arbitrary for the 
FDA to admit that the political pressure means that it needs more information that usual 
to defend its decision-making.  In fact, allowing the FDA to cite political influences as 
the reasons for requiring more information would prevent it from suggesting scientific 
uncertainty when there is little to none. 
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Judges are good at evaluating policy and not as good at evaluating science.  
Administrative law seems structured to keep judges from evaluating what they are good 
at evaluating and confine them to what they are poor at evaluating.  While we don’t want 
judges, as unelected officials, to strike down policies left and right, they already, to a 
certain extent, do while evaluating administrative agency decision-making
111.  As Cass 
Sunstein and Thomas Miles found while analyzing Supreme Court and circuit court of 
appeals decisions that reviewing agency interpretations of the law, the application of the 
Chevron framework and whether the judges validate the agency determinations depends a 
great deal on the judges’ political and ideological convictions
112.  However, requiring 
them on the face to evaluate scientific evidence creates the possibility that the courts or 
the agencies will manipulate the scientific evidence to suggest uncertainty when there is 
none.  This is directly tied into the problem of increasing political influences that 
agencies cannot be honest and open about. 
A better policy would be to have the courts ought to focus on something they 
have better knowledge of—the interplay between the policy motivations and scientific 
evidence.  This would require still some evaluation of the scientific evidence underlying 
agency decisions.  However, the inquiry would not end at the certainty of the evidence.  
Instead, courts should look at scientific evidence as one piece of the puzzle.  They should 
also look at the political rationales, if there are any, behind agency decisions.  This would 
reduce the pressure placed on scientific evidence to support agency decision-making.  In 
the case of Tummino, it would allow the court to evaluate the political influence on the 
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treatment of Plan B within the actual context of the modern administrative state—one 
that is closely tied to the President and his agenda.  Obvious political influences should 
not be treated as a shocking and disgraceful exception but acknowledged to occur 
frequently and to even be a positive motivation, as in the case of the teen smoking 
regulations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  The Tummino case is a good example of the divergence between the realities of 
the administrative state and the jurisprudence that governs it.  The facts of Tummino 
show an FDA whose decisions were clearly influenced by the agenda of the Bush White 
House.  As a result, there was enough suggestion of bad faith for the magistrate judge to 
justify widening the scope of discovery to go beyond the administrative record and to 
require higher level FDA officials to testify.  In addition, the political influence in the 
Tummino case caused the judge to hold that the FDA had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when deciding the status of Plan B and to remand the decision to an FDA 
now controlled by appointees of the Obama White House.  Without the Bush White 
House agenda it is unlikely that either the magistrate judge or the district court judge 
would have found indicates of bad faith upon the part of the FDA. 
  However, it is not sensible to punish the FDA for something that is quite usual in 
the course of modern agency decision-making.  Since Reagan’s presidency, Presidents 
have been working to tie administrative agencies, such as the FDA, closer to their own 
political agendas.  This can take the form of encouraging deregulation or it can be used to   34 
urge additional regulation, as in the Clinton years.  Another distinction in Presidential 
influence on agencies is the distinction between pushing an agency to be more sensitive 
to the priorities of the particular administration and preventing the agency from properly 
carrying out its mandate and purpose.   
  A more sensitive judicial regime would allow agencies to admit their political 
influences and motivations.  This would allow agencies such as the FDA to be honest 
about the influence a President may have in setting their priorities and agendas.  In 
Tummino it would have perhaps allowed the FDA to acknowledge that the Bush White 
House placed pressure on it to be at least very thorough in its investigation of an OTC 
switch for Plan B.   While this new judicial regime would not excuse mandate hijacking, 
it would give more flexible to reflect the increasing close relationship between 
administrative agencies’ agendas and the agendas of the White House. 
 